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C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001459

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TAGS: [MARR](#) [MCAP](#) [PARM](#) [OPRC](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [AZ](#) [US](#) [UP](#)  
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE TALKING POINTS DELIVERED:  
FURTHER QUESTIONS

REF: A. STATE 80555

- [1](#)B. STATE 77010
- [1](#)C. KYIV 779
- [1](#)D. KYIV 615

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is a request for guidance. See para 6.

[1](#)2. (U) Ambassador, accompanied by Army Attache and poloff, met with Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko June 11 to deliver the response to Ukrainian missile defense questions (ref B). We provided written talking points, a Ukrainian courtesy translation, and the power-point briefing slides. Hrytsenko thanked Ambassador for the information, and then clarified that he was seeking not an unattributed non-paper but a signed, official communication with the U.S. position. He was specifically seeking a response for three questions to which Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt. Gen Obering had provided oral, affirmative answers during his visit to Kyiv (ref D). In amplifying remarks, Hrytsenko suggested that U.S. willingness to undertake certain steps could function as a kind of security and confidence building measure that he wanted to be able to share (presumably with the Russians, among others) to allay fears and counter Russian arguments.

[1](#)3. (U) Hrytsenko continued that the three questions were:

-- Would the U.S. be willing to share early warning data regarding missile launches with third countries?

-- Would the U.S. be willing to permit "verification" visits, to ensure that the Polish and Czech facilities were being maintained and operated according to U.S. stated intentions?

-- Would the U.S. be willing to allow the stationing of Ukrainian, Russian, or other third-country experts at the facilities?

On the last question, Hrytsenko noted the main reason for wanting Russians (and Ukrainians) on site was to take away the threat of Russians targeting the facilities.

[1](#)4. (C) When we tried to explain that more explicit language regarding U.S. willingness to host visits had been precluded by Czech and Polish sensitivities, Hrytsenko reacted skeptically. He argued that he could convince his Polish and Czech counterparts "in five minutes." The statement was not about what the U.S. would do, but what the U.S. would be willing to do, which did not in fact require Polish or Czech agreement. He dismissed our point that the domestic political situation in both countries made Czech and Polish officials reluctant to make such controversial statements.

Domestic opposition in the two countries, Hrytsenko rebutted, would welcome statements that met Russian concerns halfway. He opined that the U.S. had not tried very hard to convince its allies.

¶5. (C) Ambassador also asked for Hrytsenko's reaction regarding the Russian proposal to use the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan (ref A). Ambassador noted the Gabala radar would likely not substitute for the planned facilities, but might be employed in addition. Hrytsenko opined that use of the existing Russian strategic warning systems, including the radar in Ukraine, would be a good step that demonstrated that missile defense also protected Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, as well as Western Europe.

¶6. (U) Request that Department coordinate with MDA either to issue a letter containing ref B talking points or to authorize us to transmit the talking points under cover of our transmittal letter. We further request that Department provide a letter with responses to Hrytsenko's three additional questions.

¶7. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:  
[www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kyiv](http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kyiv).  
Taylor